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Abstract—The advent of data-driven real-time applications requires the
implementation of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) on Machine Learning
accelerators. Google’s Tensor Processing Unit (TPU) is one such neural
network accelerator that uses systolic array-based matrix multiplication
hardware for computation in its crux. Manufacturing faults at any state
element of the matrix multiplication unit can cause unexpected errors
in these inference networks. In this paper, we propose a formal model
of permanent faults and their propagation in a TPU using the Discrete-
Time Markov Chain (DTMC) formalism. The proposed model is analyzed
using the probabilistic model checking technique to reason about the
likelihood of faulty outputs. The obtained quantitative results show that
the classification accuracy is sensitive to the type of permanent faults
as well as their location, bit position and the number of layers in the
neural network. The conclusions from our theoretical model have been
validated using experiments on a digit recognition-based DNN.
Index Terms—Neural Network Accelerator, Tensor Processing Unit
(TPU), Probabilistic Model Checking, Stuck-at Faults.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of low-latency applications necessitate the imple-
mentation of Deep Neural Network (DNN) accelerators on Internet-
of-things (IoT) edge devices to enhance system performance. In this
direction, researchers have come up with special-purpose accelerators
[1], [2] to expedite the computationally exhaustive Multiplication-
Accumulation (MAC) operation of a DNN, which manifests itself
as a performance bottleneck. This has been efficiently circumvented
by the concept of systolic array, which is an arrangement of data
processing units in a two-dimensional homogeneous grid [3]. Google
leveraged this concept to develop Tensor Processing Unit (TPU)
as their high performing DNN accelerator [1]. TPU uses a 256
× 256 systolic array-based matrix multiplication unit, furnishing
1530× higher performance and 3080× higher performance-per-watt
over contemporary CPUs and GPUs [1]. In this paper, this TPU
architecture from Google is used as a standard baseline design,
although our analysis can be extended to any systolic array-based
DNN accelerator.
Any Integrated Circuit (IC) is susceptible to manufacturing defects.
Faults in a system can be permanent, which result in an unexpected
inference outcome. Fault analysis on an accelerator is a fundamental
pillar towards calculating error probability. Prior works on faults
in systolic array-based hardware designs were discussed in [4]–[6],
where the authors injected faulty MAC units in the systolic array
and demonstrated intense performance penalty of the network under
faults. Fault mitigation approaches were also explored, either by
compromising classification accuracy or by increasing area overhead.
However, none of these articles focus on a formal analysis to estimate
the terminating error probability.
This article focuses on developing a formal model using the
Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) formalism that captures the
behavior of a permanent fault in a TPU. The proposed model is
analyzed using the probabilistic model checking (PMC) [7] technique
to reason about the probability of misclassified outcomes. PMC is a
formal verification technique that furnishes numerically exact answers
to the temporal logic queries by virtue of its exhaustive analysis, in
contrast to discrete-event simulations. The quantitative analysis using
our model shows that the type of permanent faults (stuck-at-1 vs.
stuck-at-0), the position of the permanent faults, and the number of
layers in the neural network directly impact the classification accuracy
of the DNN accelerator. Such analysis can aid in approximating the
sensitivity of the hardware under various fault parameters, and thus
can help the designers to adopt the proper fault mitigation techniques,
thereby increasing the yield. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work that proposes a formal modeling and quantitative analysis
of permanent faults in DNN accelerators.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the
background information on a systolic array-based TPU is presented.
Section III presents the modeling of stuck-at faults in the MAC array,
and their propagation through the accelerator to the output. Section
IV explains the experimental results and validation of our proposed
model. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A neural network consists of multiple computation layers that
extract relevant features from raw input data to perform prediction
via the complex analytical architecture. Each layer comprises multiple
neurons that perform matrix multiplication, followed by a non-linear
activation function. The complex computation of DNNs is efficiently
implemented using a systolic array architecture, which is a N × N
homogeneous grid of densely connected MAC units in commercial
accelerators like TPU [1]. MACr,c represents a MAC unit at the
intersection of rth row and cth column. Layers are mapped onto
the systolic array grid, where each column represents a neuron in a
distinct layer. At first, the weight matrix is loaded into the systolic
array through the weight memory and the activation inputs are loaded
into the activation memory. In the first clock cycle, the unit MAC1,1
computes the product between weight element and the corresponding
activation input, after which the result is transferred vertically to
MAC2,1 and the activation input is transferred horizontally to the
MAC1,2. In the second clock stage, the MAC2,1 and the MAC1,2
computes the corresponding product. This process is replicated until
the accumulators finally add up the products from each MAC
column, following which the results move into the activation block
to be fed into the subsequent quantization phase to meet specific
hardware constraints. The quantized output is eventually provided as
activation to the subsequent layer in the network.
III. MODELING
Let FTPU be a TPU whose systolic array has R rows and C
columns while one of its MAC units has a permanent fault. Let this
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faulty MAC unit be denoted as FMACr,c, which is positioned at row
r and column c of the systolic array. Also, let NFTPU be another TPU
which has the same attributes as FTPU, but without a permanent fault.
We consider a Neural Network (NN) whose attributes and related
functions are given below.
• The NN has L layers, with N neurons in each layer (1 ≤ N ≤ R),
where l represents any layer ranging from 1 to L.
• All layers in the network are fully connected and use the same
set of weights from the matrix WN×N , where wi,j represents the
weight at the intersection of ith row and jth column.
• The activations provided to layer l, X(l), is defined as:
X(l) =
[
x1(l) x2(l) . . . xN (l)
]T (1)
where any xi(l) is the activation of neuron i at layer l.
• Let a and m be the row and column indices of WN×N . Also, let
the multiplication result of the MAC unit loaded with wa,m be
ya,m(l), and let the accumulation result of the same MAC unit be
Ya,m(l) during the execution of layer l. The mth activation of the
next layer, xm(l + 1), is calculated as follows:
ya,m(l) = xa(l)× wa,m (2)
Ya,m(l) = y1,m + ...+ ya−1,m + ya,m (3)
xm(l + 1) = φ(YN,m) (4)
where φ is the activation function and 1 ≤ a ≤ m ≤ N . We
considered Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) as the activation function.
When a layer with N neurons is being processed, only the MAC
units inside the bottom leftmost N × N square area receive and
process activations. We call this zone of MAC units as the effective
area. Any MACr,c that satisfies the conditions (rinv ≤ N) and
(c ≤ N) will be inside the effective area, where rinv = R − r + 1
is defined as the inverse row number. As the effective area changes
according to N , the activation which arrives to a particular MAC
unit also changes. To interpret which activation will be processed by
a MACr,c, we define a relative row number rr = r − R + N . A
MAC unit, MACrr,c, calculates yrr,c by multiplying xrr with wrr,c,
and accumulates yrr,c with Yrr−1,c to produce Yrr,c.
We focus on the problem of determining the probability of having
error-free output from FTPU if NN is feed-forwarded through it.
The proposed model is based on calculating and comparing the
results of FTPU and NFTPU for all possible set of activations.
The model exhaustively calculates the probabilities depending on the
given probability distribution of each activation value inside X(1).
We investigate this problem for three different hardware fault cases:
Case 1: One bit is stuck-at-0 or 1 in the weight register of FMACr,c.
Case 2: One bit is stuck-at-0 or 1 in the accumulator of FMACr,c.
Case 3: One bit is stuck-at-0 or 1 in the multiplier of FMACr,c.
For all these three cases, we represent the index of the stuck-at bit
with SP , and type of the stuck-at fault with ST which can be either
0 or 1. Also, we use SM = 2SP to represent the stuck-at mask.
The effect of FMACr,c should be expressed mathematically for
each fault case in order to develop a solution to the problem. This
effect is applied on all layers of NN individually as the systolic
array is used repetitively for each layer. Let us consider Case 1. It
is important to note that, when FMACr,c is not inside the effective
area, or when the stuck-at error does not change the weight loaded
to it (which means masked), the stuck-at fault won’t have any effect.
Even if the fault changes the weight, the produced error might be
masked after the activation function, or quantization.
The following equation expresses the fault effect for Case 1, Fw(l),
which is an integer added to YN,c(l) after processing layer l.
Fw(l) =

SM × xrr(l), if C0 ∧ ¬C1
−(SM × xrr(l)), if C0 ∧ ¬C2
0, otherwise
(5)
The conditions in the expression represent:
• C0 (Effective area): (rinv ≤ N) ∧ (c ≤ N)
• C1 (Stuck-at-1 masked): [(wrr,c & SM) 6= 0] ∧ (ST = 1)
• C2 (Stuck-at-0 masked): [(wrr,c & SM) = 0] ∧ (ST = 0)
where ∧, ¬, and & denotes the logical-and, logical-negation, and
bit-wise-and operators, respectively. The condition C0 states that
FMACr,c is going to be inside the effective area. Depending on
the value of wrr,c, the fault can be masked inside FMACr,c, which
is stated as condition C1 for stuck-at-1, and C2 for stuck-at-0.
Case 2 has two different effects. The first one is simply altering the
value Yrr,c(l). The second effect can happen only if the accumulator
of FMACr,c has stuck-at-1 fault. This effect is caused by triggering
all MAC units with the same clock, which forces them to produce
an output value at every cycle. FMACr,c produces a value equal
to SM , unlike non-faulty MAC units which produce a zero when
they are not processing activations. The produced SM values go
down through the column c and the ones that reach to the bottom
accumulator are added to YN,c(l). We define this as leaking effect.
The error representing Case 2, Fa(l) can be expressed as follows:
Fa(l) =

(2N − rinv + 1)× SM, if C3 ∨ (C0 ∧ ¬C4)
(2N − rinv)× SM, if C0 ∧ C4
−SM, if C0 ∧ ¬C5
0, otherwise
(6)
Apart from C0, other conditions in the equation indicate:
• C3 (Upper effective area):
(ST = 1) ∧ (N < rinv ≤ 2N) ∧ (c ≤ N)
• C4 (Stuck-at-1 masked): (ST = 1) ∧ (Yrr,c(l) & SM) 6= 0
• C5 (Stuck-at-0 masked): (ST = 0) ∧ (Yrr,c(l) & SM) = 0
where ∨ represents logical-or operator. The condition C3 represents
an area of systolic array where FMACr,c does not process activation,
but it effects the YN,c(l) due to the leaking effect. Please note that,
for N neurons, TPU requires 2N + 1 cycles to finish the systolic
array operation. C4 and C5 represent the situation where stuck-at
fault does not change Yrr,c(l).
Lastly, we will discuss Case 3. The leaking effect behaves in the
same way as in Case 2, since the output of multiplier is connected
to the accumulator inside the MAC unit. The equation of the total
error being produced for Case 3 defined as Fm(l) is as follows:
Fm(l) =

(2N − rinv + 1)× SM, if C3 ∨ (C0 ∧ ¬C6)
(2N − rinv)× SM, if C0 ∧ C6
−SM, if C0 ∧ ¬C7
0, otherwise
(7)
The conditions C6 and C7 used in the expression denote:
• C6 (Stuck-at-1 masked): (ST = 1) ∧ (yrr,c(l) & SM) 6= 0
• C7 (Stuck-at-0 masked): (ST = 0) ∧ (yrr,c(l) & SM) = 0
Using the equations (5), (6), and (7), we model the FTPU and
NFTPU in the presence of faults. The model has two main parts —in-
put selection and result calculation. The input selection is modeled
using a probabilistic automaton, specifically using DTMC formalism.
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Fig. 1: Representation of (a) IS-DTMC and (b) TPU-FA automaton.
The result calculation is modeled as a special case of probabilistic
automaton to demonstrate respective deterministic behavior.
Definition 1 (IS-DTMC). The process of selecting an input value
for a single neuron of the first layer can be defined as a DTMC
Dx = (S, sinit, TL, P, L), where:
– S = {s0, s1, ..., sv}, where each si ∈ S represents an input i > 0;
– sinit = {s0}, is the initial state;
– TL = {i1, i2, ..., iv} is a set of transition labels.
– P : S × S → [0, 1] is a transition probability matrix such that∑
s′∈S p(s, s
′) = 1, representing probability distribution of inputs.
– L : S → 2AP is a function to label each state si ∈ S from the set
of Atomic Propositions AP = {not selected, selected};
Visual illustration of IS-DTMC is given in Figure 1a, where state
s0 denotes that the input is not selected yet, and all other states
represent the selected input values. Each transition has probability
pz for selecting input iz , where 1 ≤ z ≤ v. An IS-DTMC will
have v = 2b transitions if b bits are used to represent the input
neuron values in the TPU. The transition probabilities in a uniform
distribution can be represented as p1 = p2 = ... = pm = 1/v. A
single neuron can be modeled using a IS-DTMC model. To model
N number of neurons, N number of IS-DTMC models are required
which are synchronized using the transition label. The selected input
values are then passed to the output calculation part represented using
the TPU-FA (TPU-Fault Analysis) automaton.
Definition 2 (TPU-FA Automaton). The execution steps to analyze
the outputs of NFTPU and FTPU can be defined as a special case
of the probabilistic automaton E = (S, sinit, TL, P, L) where:
– S = {s0, s1, s2, s3, s4}, represents the state of execution;
– sinit = {s0}, is the initial state;
– TL = {Init,SA,AF&Q,No Error,Error} is a set of transition labels;
– P : S × S → [0, 1] is a transition probability matrix, where prob-
abilities are set to 1, since the execution steps are deterministic.
– L : S → 2AP is a function to label each state si ∈ S from the set
of Atomic Propositions AP = {begin, ready, calculating, end};
The TPU-FA automaton E represents the execution cycle of
a TPU as illustrated in Figure 1b. Firstly, it takes the transition
Init to initialize inputs chosen by the IS-DTMCs. At state s1, if
the feedforward has not completed yet, it takes the transition SA
(Systolic Array) to state s2 and processes the next layer by doing
the systolic array calculations for both the NFTPU and the FTPU.
For calculating the result of FTPU, it uses the equations (5), (6) or
(7), depending on the chosen fault case. Afterwards, it goes back to
s1 by transition AF&Q(Activation Function & Quantization)
while forwarding the results through the activation function followed
by the quantization. When all the layers are processed, the TPU-FA
automaton compares the results of both TPUs in state s1. If the results
are equal, then the automaton takes the transition No Error leading
to state s3, if not, then it takes the transition Error leading to s4.
For modeling and automated analysis of the proposed model, we
use the probabilistic model checking (PMC) technique [8], more
specifically, the PRISM model checker [7]. We are interested in
analyzing the case where the outputs from NFTPU and FTPU are not
equal. This property can be formalized in Probabilistic Computation
Tree Logic (PCTL) [9] as P=?[ F “error” ], where “error” represents
state s4 and F represent the eventually operator.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experimental Setup
In this section, we present the modeling results and validate them.
For the experiments, we consider a systolic array prototype with a
grid of 4 × 4 MAC units. Each of the weight and the activation
registers have a length of 4 bits, thereby furnishing a multiplier
output of length 8 bits and an accumulator output of length 10 bits.
For the DTMC model, the weights are chosen randomly for each
neuron. Given a fixed width of weight and activation registers, the
total number of states and transitions in the model M (after the
parallel composition) depends on the number of layers.
B. Modeling Results
1) Impact of Number of Layers on Error Probability: In this
experiment, the probability of having an error in the output is
observed for a model with incremental layers in the network, by
inducing faults at individual bit positions of the weight register.
Figure 2a and 2d exhibit consistent increase in error probability with
the increase in number of layers from 1 to 5, as well as with the
variation of stuck-at positions in the weight from the Least Significant
Bit (LSB) ‘0’ through the Most Significant Bit (MSB) ‘3’ for a
distinct layer in the DNN model, for both stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1
respectively. As the significance of the bit position increases from the
LSB to the MSB, the deviation from the accurate value consistently
enhances, thereby increasing the probability of an erroneous output.
Furthermore, since all the layers in the model are fully connected, a
single unmasked fault in a MAC unit of a particular layer affects all
the connected nodes in the subsequent layers, thus enhancing output
error probability.
2) Impact of Faulty MAC Position on Error Probability: In
this experiment, stuck-at-1 faults are introduced in each bit of the
multiplier and accumulator for individual MAC units in rows one
through four, all positioned in the first column of the systolic array.
Figure 2c and Figure 2f represent the variation of error probability
for individual faulty MAC row locations, considering faults in the
multiplier and the accumulator respectively. As the row position
of a faulty MAC unit varies from one through four, it approaches
nearer to final accumulator output. In this scenario, the generated
error from the fault becomes difficult to mask due to reduced effect
of ensuing MAC units, thereby gradually increasing the output error
probability. However, after a certain bit position in both the graphs,
the variation does not follow the pattern. This can be primarily
subjected to overflow issues, which arise as a result of leaking
effect from the stuck-at-1 fault in higher order bits. For example,
let us consider Case 2 where N = 4, FMAC1,1, SM = 28, and
the condition (C0 ∧ C4) is satisfied. In this case, Fm(l) will be
equal to (2N − rinv) ∗ SM = (8 − 4) ∗ 28 = 210, which will
overflow and become 0 as the accumulator can only accommodate
ten bits. This effect can be seen in Figure 2f, for a specific set of
random weights, where the error probability reduces to 0.125 for
Row 1 when SM = 28. However, bit truncation operation in the
quantization phase also plays a trivial role in this phenomenon. In
Figure 2f, although overflow does not occur for SM = 27, the fault
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(a) Sensitivity of stuck-at-0 bit positions. (b) Validation: Accuracy vs. bit positions (s-a-0). (c) Sensitivity of layers for fault in multiplier.
(d) Sensitivity of stuck-at-1 bit positions. (e) Validation: Accuracy vs. bit positions (s-a-1). (f) Sensitivity of layers for fault in accumulator.
Fig. 2: Analyzing output behavior for diverse fault parameters.
gets masked as a result of quantization and the error probability
plummets close to zero. On the other hand, for SM = 29, even
though there is an overflow effect, the error probability increases,
because the cumulative effect of the fault throughout the register
cannot entirely be masked by bit truncation.
C. Validation Results
The observations from the proposed hypothesis are validated by
simulating a neural network using Keras in Python. The model is
trained on MNIST handwritten digit database of 60,000 images. A
low classification accuracy of a model is illustrative of a high output
error probability and vice-versa. Both stuck-at-0 and 1 faults are
induced in the weights and the mean accuracy is plotted, as shown
in Figure 2b and Figure 2e respectively.
From the plots, it is observed that as the faulty bit position
varies from LSB ‘1’ to MSB ‘7’, the impact on prediction accuracy
increases, thereby corroborating our observation on the impact of
faulty bit position. The increase in number of faulty layers in the
network also reduces the accuracy significantly, as observed from the
hypothesised fault model. The observation on faulty MAC position
cannot be directly verified by the validation model as it cannot
access the accumulated output of each MAC unit in the systolic
array individually. However, a fault in the multiplier can be translated
to a fault in the weight matrix, the impact of which have been
validated as shown in Figure 2b and Figure 2e. The classification
model has an initial accuracy of 97.72% without any stuck-at faults.
With the induction of fault in the seventh bit position, the accuracy
reduces to an average of 10.15% and 11.13% for stuck-at-0 and
stuck-at-1 respectively. Hence, the obtained results are coherent with
the analytics derived from the formal model, thereby justifying the
correctness of the model.
V. CONCLUSION
The proposed formal model and an extensive analysis of permanent
faults in a TPU provide an insight into its expected behavior.
The obtained results show that the number of layers in a neural
network, the type of faults and their location have a direct impact on
the probability of misclassification. The proposed high-level model
can be used by the hardware designers in adopting proper fault
mitigation techniques for improving the yield. Note, in addition to the
number of layers, the size of the model (the number of states) also
depends on the size of activation and weight registers. Since PRISM
includes multiple model checking engines enabling the probabilistic
verification of models of up to 1010 states, it suffers from state space
explosion problem. However, different state abstraction techniques
exist to overcome this issue. In the future, we plan to model the
effect of temporal faults in TPUs (such as soft-errors [10]).
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